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ABSTRACT:
Tittle of dissertation: PRIVATISATION OF SHIPPING AGENCY SERVICES
IN TANZANIA.
A case study of an economic policy problem.
DEGREE:

MSC.

This dissertation is a study of the privatisation of shipping agency sector in Tanzania.
The study addresses the factors that led to privatisation, how privatisation was
carried out, and its impact on the national economy.
A brief review is made of the portfolio and performance of the shipping agency
functions under the state owned company “The National Shipping Agencies
Company (NASACO)” before privatisation, in order to examine the strengths and
weaknesses of such public enterprises. The structure of the Tanzanian Privatisation
Policy is described, and the respective program for privatising the shipping agency is
explained so as to give a clear understanding of privatisation and its objectives. The
study identifies the primary objectives of privatising shipping agency sector as to
remove the monopoly of NASACO, to promote efficiency by encouraging
competition, and to increase the contribution of shipping agency services (as private
sector) in the economy. The study analyses results of privatisation in order to assess
the success and the failure of privatisation excise. The success was evidenced by
customer satisfaction and by increased efficiency and quality of services rendered by
new agency companies.

On the other hand privatisation resulted in unfair

competition between the players, concentration of powers by foreign shipping lines
and elimination of local agency companies from the market. The concluding chapter
offers several recommendations that need to be considered and implemented to
rectify the present situation in the shipping agency sector.
Key words: Privatisation, Monopoly, Promote, Efficiency, Competition.
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CHAPTER ONE:
1.0

INTRODUCTION:

After independence in 1961, Tanzania decided to adopt a policy of socialism for its
economic development. The first step was to nationalise the means of production by
transferring the ownership of all economic activities from private hands to the
government, aimed at collective production and consumption. The government put
more emphasis on social services such as health, education, housing, water and
employment.
After nationalisation, the national economy development was dominated by the State
with centralised planning, corrective intervention in resource allocation and
controlled foreign exchange as part of the government’s strategies.
1.1

Creation of the state owned enterprises:

In order to run the nationalised activities and property; the government created State
owned enterprises ( SOEs) or public enterprises ( PEs), which were mainly
administered by local Tanzanians. The public enterprises were expected to generate
public savings for investments and economic growth in order to achieve social and
economical goals. Employment generation, subsidisation of goods and services and
regional equalisation were among the State’s objectives on public enterprises.
1.2.

Failure of the public enterprises:

The policy of State management of the economy violated the principles of the free
market. The creation of State monopolies resulted in a monopolistic environment;
lack of competition caused inefficiency and insufficiently productive State
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enterprises, a situation that forced the government to subsidise production. Poorly
trained managers, who lacked direction and vision, managed most of the public
enterprises.
The enterprises were characterised by overstaffing, insufficient financial control
systems and political interference.

Employees’ lack of business consciousness,

insensitivity to customer demand, poor quality of goods and services, and lack of
accountability were serious problems for those enterprises. Consequently the
companies were unprofitable and had a poor return on investment.
Loss making enterprises have been a significant burden on the government budgets
Due to various problems faced by the public enterprises, most of them failed to
generate an investible surplus and instead they created a budgetary burden on the
public sector. No government objectives for establishing public enterprises were
attained as planned.
An overall impact of the poor performance on the public sector was the widening of
the vicious circle, whose slow and low economic growth resulted in low investment
and general poverty of the nation.
1.3.

The remedial action:

The public sector became a heavy burden on the government; debts were
accumulated, productivity was poor and there was an increasing trend towards
money swindling, contrary to the government’s expectations.

The situation

illustrated the failure of the policy and therefore, raised the need to reverse it.
Promoting and encouraging private investment through privatisation of the public
sector was seen as the key to the way ahead.
Another factor that contributed to the reversal of the policy was the global
transformation from static and socialist ideas to a market based economy.
Developing countries including Tanzania had to adopt free market principles by
maximising the role of the market forces in the public sector on one hand, and by
reducing the government role in economic development on the other.
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The study will focus on liberalisation of the shipping agency services in the country.
At the time when State-owned enterprises were established, all shipping agency
services were placed under the State enterprise named the National Shipping
Agencies Company Limited (NASACO). As the sole shipping agent, the company
enjoyed a State of monopoly and hence its performance was very good for its entire
life up to the year 1992 when the performance started to decline. There were various
problems that contributed to the poor performance, including unfavourable weather
for agricultural production which resulted in a decline in agricultural products as the
main exports of Tanzania. Civil war in the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and
Burundi hampered the transit cargo to/from those landlocked countries that used the
port of Dar-es-Salaam for their sea borne trade. Acute inflation that decreased the
value of the Tanzanian shilling (Tsh.) made imports more costly and hence decreased
the quantity of import cargo. However the privatisation of NASACO was not due to
inefficiency, it was due to the government’s decision to withdraw itself from
commercial activities in order to let market forces play their role in economic
development. NASACO was first listed for restructuring to promote efficiency
before full liberalisation of agency services when the company would have to
compete with other agency companies.
1.4.

Problem definition.

The government’s decision to restructure NASACO was aimed at eliminating its
monopoly power and improving efficiency through competition. The restructuring
program was very clear and it had a public support. NASACO was given a period of
three years to restructure before full liberalisation of the sector. During the period,
however an abrupt decision of the Minister of Trade and Industries to issue agency
licenses to private companies including major shipping lines effectively nullified the
approved program.

Taking into consideration that the agency business was

dominated by the liner agencies, then to allow the shipping lines to operate their own
agency offices was to prevent the independent agents (locals) from participating in
the business. The situation was made worse by the fact that the sector was liberalised
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without a proper legal framework as guidance to the new structure. The government
Act on the Fair Trade Practices and a Code of Conduct for shipping agents was still
under preparation.
1.5.

The significance of the problem:

The significance of the problem was derived from the fear that the benefits of
privatisation may not be gained due to the wrong implementation of the privatisation
program. The government, through the Minister of Trade and Industries, acted
against its own policies regarding the restructuring program of NASACO. The
government had objectives for restructuring and obviously the program was set
according to those objectives. If the program was not followed, then the objectives
would not be attained. Chapter Two will look at the policy of privatisation in
Tanzania and how it was implemented in liberalising shipping agency services.
Privatisation was accepted as a way of economic revival. The success of privatisation
depended not only on how the program was formulated, but also on its
implementation and the achievement of the objectives. Unless privatisation took
place under favourable conditions without adverse consequences then its very
credibility would be affected. For this reason therefore, a privatisation strategy was
needed, that would address the concerns of the affected groups, build consensus
about the key privatisation objectives and obtain public support for the program.
The consequences of liberalisation of the agency sector will be discussed in Chapter
Three.
1.6

The purpose of this study.

The purpose of this study is to examine the liberalisation of shipping agency services
in Tanzania, the consequences of that liberalisation and its implications for the
national economy and for society in general.
Chapter Four will give a critical analysis of privatisation and its implications with
regard to the agency sector.
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Research methodology:
The study involved discovery through literature reviews of published and
unpublished materials relating to shipping. It also involved reports from NASACO,
the Tanzania Harbours Authority, and the Ministry of Trade and Industries,
publications from the WMU library, information from internet sources and
information obtained from shipping companies during our field trips. Various
shipping lines were visited (in Tanzania) to obtain their views on the changes.
Potential shippers and major freight forwarders were also contacted.
Limitation of the study.
The study was hampered by poor response from shipping lines especially those who
are operating their own agency offices in Tanzania. Most of the shippers and freight
forwarders were reluctant to comment on the changes by saying that it was too early
to feel the impact of changes. The performance reports of NASACO used in the
study are for the period from 1991/92 to 1995/96, because from 1997 NASACO was
under restructuring therefore there was no report on NASACO as a single company
from that year.
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CHAPTER TWO.
2.0

A POLICY OF PRIVATISATION IN TANZANIA.
2.1 A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY:

Privatisation means transferring publicly owned assets to the private sector either by
the sale of assets, by deregulating the whole public sector and opening up state
monopoly to greater competition, or by joint capital projects. The thrust of the
reform in Tanzania was necessitated by the need for improvement in economic
growth rates and enhancement of investment levels. The government withdrew from
running the business, and assumed the role of policy co-ordination and regulation. It
encouraged the establishment and expansion of the private sector, which the
government recognised as the engine of economic development and sustainability.
This Chapter is divided in two parts. Part One will describe the privatisation policy
and Part Two will look at liberalisation of shipping agency services.
The process of economic reform started in the 1980s. This was a most decisive
period when the government started implementing a new policy of trade
liberalisation with gradual reduction, and finally elimination, of price controls. The
public reform component was aimed at achieving full commercial viability, and the
objective was pursued by diverting public enterprise ownership and control away
from government, and by restructuring enterprises to become commercially viable
and self-sustaining. The government therefore privatised (and continues to privatise)
the public sector through the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC).
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The government outlined its primary and secondary objectives of privatising the
public sector as follows: 2.1.1. Primary objectives of Privatisation:
(i)

To improve the operational efficiency of public enterprises and their
contribution to the national economy.

(ii)

To reduce the burden of public enterprises on the government budget.

(iii)

To expand the role of the private sector in the economy so as to permit the
government to concentrate on its role as a provider of basic public utilities
such as education, health and infrastructure.

(iv)

To encourage wider participation by private individuals in the ownership
through the purchase of company shares.

The above objectives were to be achieved through commercialisation, restructuring
and divestiture of the activities of all significant enterprises in the public sector.
2.1.2.

Secondary objectives:

(i)

To create a more market-oriented economy.

(ii)

To secure access to foreign markets.

(iii)

To promote the development of a capital market
.

The public enterprises were divided into three categories:
(i)

Social services institutions.

(ii)

Public utilities.

(ii)

Commercial enterprises.

The government decided on the following methods for divestiture.
(i)

Public share offering

(ii)

Public sale, including joint venture.

(iii)

Public auction.
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(iv)

Management buyout

(v)

Management contracts or lease of assets.

(vi)

Liquidation.

The author’s area of concentration will be on the commercial enterprise category.
Commercial enterprises were to become available to foreign and local participation.
Those unprofitable enterprises that could not attract private investors were to be
closed and liquidated.

Certain commercial enterprises were to be subject to

restructuring prior to sale. (NASACO as the Model Company was in this category).
2.2.

OPERATING POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES: PRIVATISATION:

The work of the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission was to be guided by the
following principles (as per Parastatal Privatisation and Reform Master Plan).
2.2.1.

Transparency:

The overall reform process (i.e. individual divestitures and reforms) was to be carried
out with a maximum degree of transparency and public accountability consistent
with commercial confidentiality. The intention was to divest individual enterprises.
Information on their financial performance, bidding procedures, criteria for bid
evaluation and the results were all to be publicised. The associated ministries and
firms were to be represented in decision-making committees to provide checks and
balances.
2.2.2

Consumer interests:

The PSRC and the sector ministries were to ensure that consumer interests were
protected.

If it materialised that despite the liberalisation of domestic and

international policies, competition was insufficient, consumers would be assisted by
legislation to ban price fixing and any restrictions on the entry of new firms to any
industry. The provision of services by monopolies such as telecommunications and
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power supply would be subject to regulations that balanced the long-term interests of
both consumers and suppliers.
2.2.3

Safety net:

The individual employees who accepted or were required to accept redundancy from
enterprises that were sold or restructured, would be entitled to statutory benefits and
might also receive supplementary compensation. Early retirement without loss of
benefits was also considered. Redundancy costs would be borne by government in
order to avoid discouragement of potential buyers. Those who would be victims of
the whole exercise would be assisted, and advice would be provided on retraining,
relocation and establishment of small businesses.
2.2.4

Debt settlement and reorganisation:

More than half of the public enterprises were burdened with huge debts to treasury
and banks and were therefore partly or wholly unserviceable, which severely
constrained the privatisation option, future profitability and investments.

The

government, on a case by case basis, adopted a flexible approach to the cancellation
of such debts or conversion into equity at a discount; such equity could be sold to the
public at a later date. New expenditures on enterprises to be divested within a year
were discouraged.
2.2.5

Valuation:

Valuation of the business on sale was to be thoroughly assessed prior to bid
invitation using established techniques. This would include the assessment of the
present value of future earnings or the realisable market value of the existing book
value of assets. A full understanding of business prospects and risks would enable
the government (as a seller) to identify the most suitable buyers and to negotiate (for)
fair prices.

9

2.2.6

Monitoring:

PSRC was to monitor the conditions in the agreements entered into by the buyers as
well as the performance under suitable agreements of enterprises still in public
ownership. It was also to monitor the progress of the public enterprise reform
program as a whole and the results achieved. The results were to be published
annually.
As noted in the previous Chapter, other enterprises were to be reformed before full
liberalisation of the related sector. The following discussion will look at policies and
principles governing reforms of public enterprises.
2.3

OPERATING POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES: REFORMS:

Some of the public enterprises were chosen for reform and restructuring prior to sale
or were retained in public ownership. The purpose of the restructuring was to allow
a gradual transition from government ownership to private ownership of economic
activities. For the retained enterprises the following principles applied: 2.3.1

Equality of treatment:

The government would continue to pursue policies designed to give public
enterprises the same access as the private sector to resources, inputs and markets, as
well as price, tax and regulatory policies designed to improve business environment.
Preference for public enterprises would be withdrawn.
2.3.2

Accountability of company boards and management:

Accountability was seen as the key for the future of the retained public enterprises.
The performance of the retained enterprises was to be documented in performance
contracts, which were to be the reference for internal control of decision making.
The performance contract was a formal, signed document, negotiated and agreed
between government and the management on matters relating to the commercial
objectives, performance standards and indicators for the performance measurement.
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It also indicated the limit of the management authority, planning and budget approval
procedure.

The role of the government, board of directors and that of the

management were to be clarified.
2.3.3

Subsidies:

Direct and indirect subsidies were to be phased out. Limited transitional assistance
was seen as possibly necessary within the context of an agreed plan for each firm and
performance targets. If a turn around was not possible within an agreed period, the
enterprise was to be closed.
A privatisation policy should also include different methods of implementing it
depending on the type and performance of enterprises.

The following section

describes the implementation steps taken by the government for both divestiture and
reforms of enterprises.
2.4

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVATISATION POLICY:

The process of implementing government strategy for the public sector reform was to
be either by privatisation or by restructuring.
2.4.1

Privatisation methods:

The privatisation process was to be considered in three stages i.e. feasibility study on
individual enterprises, preparation and implementation of the divestiture.
2.4.1.1 Feasibility study:
This was the initial stage for launching the privatisation process of each public
enterprise and determining the most appropriate method. The choice of the method
was to depend on the objectives to be achieved from privatisation, both national
objectives and specific objectives for individual enterprises. A number of factors
were to be looked at including:
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(i)

The nature of the industry, the existing technology involved and the need
for new technology, or market access.

(ii)

The expected type and level of investor interest.

(iii)

The need, if any, to preserve the past public ownership.

(iv)

Short and long term impact on employment.

(v)

The need to maximise the proceeds of privatisation.

(vi)

The need to maximise the eventual returns to Treasury.

(vii)

The constraints of privatisation.

2.4.1.2 Preparation for privatisation:
Preparation was to include the following functions:
(i)

Carrying out financial, commercial and technical appraisal, assessment of
the products, markets and competition, resources requirement and future
prospect

(ii)

Review of the corporate structure to determine necessary changes needed
to facilitate the divestiture

(iii)

A legal review of the enterprise and the regulatory environment in which it
operated to identify possible drawbacks.

(iv)

Preparation of initial valuation of the enterprises.

The scope of work to be carried would depend on the privatisation option selected.
For example a public offering would need more time for preparation than a direct
sale, while liquidation would require a different approach.
2.4.2

Implementation of the divestiture:

The first two stages (i.e. the feasibility study and the preparation stage) were to be
the building blocks for planning the final stage of the process. The implementation
process would again depend on the divestiture method selected, the process would
include the functions of: -
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(i)

Marketing the offer by advertising and trade searches to identify potential
buyers.

(ii)

Invitations to bid.

(iii)

Assessment of the bids.

(iv)

Negotiations with potential buyers.

(v)

Obtaining government approval for sale.

(vi)

Preparation of a contractual document.

(vii)

Completion of the sale

2.4.3

Reform and restructuring methods.

The reform and restructuring process was to be applied to those public enterprises
which were to be retained under the public sector either transitionally or for a longer
term, largely in public utilities such as telecommunications, power supply and water
supply. The government decision to retain an enterprise was to be subject to an
improvement in efficiency assessed by reduction in the cost of production,
enforcement of hard budget constraints by removal of direct and indirect subsidies,
enforcement of tax payments and removal of preferential access to finance and
foreign exchange. An increase in enterprise autonomy was also expected through
price control, wages distribution and marketing. Board and ministerial powers were
to be redefined and there was to be a reduction or elimination of holding corporations
and improved accountability.

The government role in relation to the retained

enterprises was to set up objectives, to monitor performance, to reward success and
penalise shortfalls.
Sections 2.1 to 2.4 described the structure of privatisation policy in Tanzania and the
procedures for its implementation. The success of any privatisation depends on how
the policy is formulated and the achievement of the objectives of the privatisation
program.
The following section will look at the performance of NASACO in a monopoly
environment before full liberalisation of shipping agency sector
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2.5

THE PERFORMANCE OF NASACO BEFORE RESTRUCTURING:

NASACO was established in 1973 primarily as a liner agent. Its mission was to
service and facilitate the transportation of Tanzania’s seaborne trade. The main
objective was to provide ship owners and their clients with satisfactory agency
services at a reasonable cost. The company enjoyed monopoly advantages through
State protection of its market, this was in conformity with the policy of socialism and
self-reliance, which was adopted after independence. Under that protection, the
company operated successfully for the first twenty-five years of its existence.
Despite its inefficiency, it employed about 700 employees, generated revenue of
about $ 10 million (about Tsh. 50 to 1$ in 1973) annually. The company paid
between Tsh. 500 to 750 million in direct taxes every year paid annual dividends of
about Tsh.100 million to a sole shareholder (the Treasury) and owned fixed assets
worth Tsh. 10 billion in Dar-es-salaam, Tanga and Mtwara branches.
The profile of NASACO services was as follows.
(i)

Ship husbandry.
Arrangement for pilotage and tug services.
Ensuring the availability of berths and working equipment
Clearing ships in and out of the port.

(ii)

Cargo canvassing, cargo booking and documentation.

(iii)

Transhipment services for overlanded or shortlanded cargo

(iv)

Processing and settlement of marine claims on behalf of principals.

(v)

Collection of freight money.

(vi)

Tallying of cargo

(vii)

Container stuffing and stripping

(viii)

Container tracing, retrieval and storage.

(ix)

Freight forwarding

(x)

Ships chandler.

(xi)

Warehousing.
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NASACO, as a sole shipping agent, rendered the above services to all shipping lines
calling at the main ports in the country i.e. Dar-es-Salaam. Tanga and Mtwara. The
performance of the company may be looked at through two-dimensions: physical
performance and financial performance.

The performance and factors that

contributed to it will be discussed as follows: 2.5.1 Physical performance
On looking at physical performance, attention should be focused on the number of
ships handled, tons discharged and loaded, and transit cargo handled during the
period under review.
2.5.1.1 Ship calls
The company handled 760 ships in 1991/92, the number increased to 857 in the
following year. From 1993/94 a steady decrease was recorded in subsequent years as
per Table 01.
2.5.1.2 Import cargo.
Import cargo handled was 3.1 million tons in 1991/92 and increased to 4.2 million
tons in 1992/3. There was a decrease from year 1993/94 to 1995/96 whereby
3.44mil tons. 3.38 mil tons and 3.28 mil tons were recorded respectively.
2.5.1.3 Export cargo.
Tanzania, as any other poor country, has very little to export. The economy is import
dependent from industrial inputs to manufactured goods. There are only very low
volumes of agricultural products such as coffee, cotton, cashew nuts and other nontraditional exported products. This can be evidenced by Table 01 whereby 2.8 mil
tons were handled in 1991/92, thereafter there was a continuous decrease in volume
down to 0.92 handled in 1995/96
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Table. 01. Five-year physical performance: 1991/92-1995/96.
Ship calls
Imports- ton (mil.)
Exports-tons (mil.)
Total tons (mil.)

1991/92
760
3.1
2.8
5.9

1992/93
857
4.2
1.7
5.9

1993/94
778
3.4
0.9
4.3

1994/95
772
3.38
0.8
4.18

1995/6
753
3.28
0.92
4.28

Source.NASACO’s annual report 1995/96
2.5.1.4 Transit cargo
Due to various economical problems Tanzania ports lost market share of transit
cargo as shown in the comparative dry cargo transit trade statistics in the two
competing ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa. For that reason, NASACO had
been losing its revenue to the neighbouring agencies. Transit cargo through
Tanzania increased by 112,000 tons i.e. from 282,000 tons in 1992 to 394,000
tons in 1996 while the port of Mombassa handled 750,000 tons in 1992 and
2,700,0000 tons in 1996, an increase of 1,950,000 tons.
2.5.2 Financial performance.
2.5.2.1 Revenue.
The performance of NASACO financially was satisfactory from 1991/92 period and
reached its peak in 1994/95 when a total of Tanzanian shillings (Tsh). 4,688.5billion
was recorded and dropped to Tsh. 4,242.7billion 1995/96. The steady growth up to
1994/95 was achieved by an increase in trade up to 1993/94 and depreciation of the
Tsh. due to inflation that increased the income figure in local currency. The rate of
exchange was Tsh. 234 to one USD in 1991/92, which increased to Tsh 530 to one
USD in 1994/95.
2.5.2.2 Expenses.
The company made a loss of Tsh. 385 million for the first time in 1994/95. There
was a differential growth rate between income and expenses; the revenue declined by
9.5% while expenses grew faster by 14.6%. An increase in expenses was partly the
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result of a government directive to increase wages and partly due to inflation that
increased operational costs. For these reasons a loss was an obvious outcome.

Table 02. Five-year financial performance: 1991/92-1995/96.
Revenue (Tsh. bil.)
Expenses (Tsh. Bil.)
Profit
(Tsh. Bil.)

1991/92
2.22
1.36
0.86

1992/93
4.12
2.29
1.83

1993/94
4.40
3.40
1.00

1994/95
4.70
4.04
0.66

1995/96
4.24
4.63
-0.39

Source: NASACO’s annual report 1995/96
2.5.3 Operational problems:
During the period under review i.e. 1991-1996 the company’s performance was poor.
Both internal and external factors played a big role in the undesirable performance of
the company. By 1995 NASACO lost about 2% of its income from commission due
to closure of services of some shipping lines such as the Zambia National Line
(ZNL), the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), Lloyd Triestino (LT) and Baltic
East Africa (BESTA).
Among the factors that contributed to the closure, was competition among the
shipping lines, slow growth of foreign trade in the region due to bad weather for
agricultural activities, and political instability in Rwanda and Burundi.
NASACO’s activities depended upon the performance of other transport
intermediaries such as ports, customs, railways and road transport. Inefficiency of
these intermediaries had a direct impact on the company’s performance as discussed
hereunder:
2.5.3.1 Port performance and competition:
Poor performance in port operations on loading and discharging together with
insufficient equipment and related facilities caused delays in cargo clearance. The
average throughput in Dar.es-Salaam port was 1000 tons per day while it was 2000
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tons per day at Mombasa port, the situation which made the users from the
neighbouring landlocked countries opt for Mombasa port.
2.5.3.2 Customs Procedures.
The bureaucracy in customs procedures was a bottleneck to the activities of the
company as a shipping agent. It had been noted that customs bond requirements for
transit cargo at Dar-es-Salaam port was 25% of cargo value, while it was 20% at
Mombasa port. High bond rates together with unnecessary complications and delays
in cargo clearance discouraged shippers, especially those from Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, Zambia and Zaire who decided to use other alternative ports such as
Mombassa. Maputo and Durban.
2.5.3.3 Railways and road transport facilities.
A shortage of railway wagons and high transport rates decreased the number of
users. It cost $2250 for one 20´/loaded container to be transferred from Dar-esSalaam to Kampala in Uganda while it cost $1850 for the same container from
Mombasa to the same destination. Most of the roads were in a poor condition, a
condition that extended the transit time. Roads, which were good, were not able to
handle heavy loads of more than 40 tons of containerised cargo.
The company like any other public enterprise had its own weaknesses, which
contributed to its poor performance namely: 2.5.3.4 Poor communication facilities.
The company had very poor communication systems partly due to an overall
inefficiency of the communication facilities countrywide and partly due to oldfashioned equipment owned by the company such as fax and telex machines. In
1992 the company managed to install new communication facilities and to
computerise part of its operations. Unfortunately in August 1995 the head office was
gutted by fire, which destroyed all communication facilities and brought the
company back to its previous state. Insurance compensation was underway.
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2.5.3.5 Insufficient storage facilities.
NASACO has a container depot, which can handle 2000 boxes only, and eleven
warehouses with a total area of 3960 sq.meters.

The facilities have not been

sufficient to accommodate both incoming and outgoing cargo and the storage of
empty containers. As a result some of the shipping lines opened their own depots,
and other lines rented private container depots and warehouses.
2.5.3.6 Container monitoring and retrieval.
The company as the shipping agent was responsible for monitoring and retrieval of
all containers on behalf of its principals. It was very difficult to monitor containers
in an effective way because the company was still applying manual methods of
monitoring boxes. Insufficient numbers of railway wagons and high trucking costs
resulted in an increasing number of abandoned empty containers, which were
destined for the hinterland stations. An increasing number of un-returned containers
forced the shipping lines to charge a container deposit payable before clearance of
the box from the port. Container deposits ranged from $500 to $1000 per one 20’
container. The container deposit was refundable upon return of the unit within the
time limit given and demurrage was charged for overstayed containers. Payment of
demurrage to principals was a burden to the nation because it was a drain on foreign
currency.
It has been seen that the financial year 1995/96 was a bad year for the company.
Apart from the listed problems, it was during the same period that Tanzania headed
into its first multi-party general election in October 1995. Importers and exporters
were quite uncertain about potential risks (civil disorder) to their business. They
didn’t want their shipments to be stranded and therefore, decided to wait for the
outcome. Consequently there was a sharp drop of cargo handled by Tanzanian ports.
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Table 03: Comparative statistics for dry cargo transit trade through Dar-es-Salaam and
Mombasa ports. 1992-1996.
From/to

Through

Uganda

Dsm
Mombasa
Burundi Dsm.
Mombasa
Rwanda Dsm.
Mombasa
Zaire
Dsm.
Mombasa
Kenya
Dsm.
Tanzania Mombasa
Total
Dsm
Mombasa

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

16.34
467.15
125.29
41.76
46.14
113.46
94.54
111.62

17.24
475.97
162.82
21.77
159.09
124.41
136.21
77.93
0.02
23.83
475.39
723.91

44.22
915.61
249.28
36.30
99.80
177.97
71.43
260.33
0.08
147.81
464.81
1538.00

55.51
1055.84
171.83
48.23
103.05
493.57
125.36
142.99
0.07
91.36
455.82
1831.99

71.99
1212.76
74.05
12.97
94.67
795.61
153.03
284.55
0.49
363.60
394.23
2669.49

14.82
282.32
748.72

Aveg.
Annual
change
43.4%
24.9%
-8.8%
-4.3%
40.5%
58.2%
18.8%
51.6%
177.5%
168.2%
10.3%
34.8%

Source: Dar-Es-Salaam port’s report on transit cargo 1997.
In this section we have seen that there were various problems which contributed to
the poor performance of NASACO. The performance of these services clearly
needed to be improved for the success of shipping agencies.
The following section discusses how liberalisation of the agency sector was
undertaken.
2.6 LIBERIZATION OF SHIPPING AGENCY SERVICES
In 1994 the former Minister of Trade and Industries, commissioned a study on
restructuring the shipping agency industry in the country. The study was undertaken
by a team of four members namely, Dr. Y. Kilindaga from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Mr. A.R. Ngemere and Mr.
B.Lyimo (Ministry of Industries and Trade) and Mr.S.I.Mushi (NASACO).
During the study the team visited shipping institutions and related government
departments in Mozambique (Maputo), Egypt (Cairo, Alexandria and Ismailia),
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Sudan (Khartoum). Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur and the port of Kelang), Singapore, Sri
Lanka (Colombo) and the United Arabs Emirates (Dubai). The visits were aimed at
studying the institutional set up and operations of shipping agency enterprises in
those countries.
After the study, the team came up with recommendations on how the National
Shipping Agencies Company was to be restructured.

The following was

recommended:
A Company structure, ownership and management.
The company was to be restructured as a holding company. The government was to
be the sole shareholder of the holding company while the head office of the company
was to manage and operate the real estate, tramps agency, Mbeya branch office,
Burundi office (Burundi was later closed and Kampala office was opened), Tanga
and Mtwara branches and ship brokerage.
In May 1997 the government approved the programme of liberalising the shipping
agency sector. The programme was to be implemented in three phases in sequential
order namely, (i) Restructuring (ii) Privatisation (iii) Liberalisation.
In the restructuring phase the government was to establish the subsidiary companies
and manage its operations through the holding company.
In the privatisation phase, the government was to have invited all regular liner
operators to buy shares in agency companies in which they had a direct interest and
to which they were contributing capital and technical know how. In this way they
were to enter into joint venture with the holding company. The liner operators were
to have been allocated 25% of the shares in each subsidiary. Fully liberalisation of
the sector was to be implemented in the third phase through licensing potential
private companies to undertake agency business.
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With regard to non-agency subsidiaries, the holding company was to allocate shares
to all major cargo interests in accordance with their level of involvement in the
activity concerned and the requirements of the capital and technical know how.
2.6.1 RESTRUCTURING OF NASACO.
The liner agency services were assigned to four autonomous divisions which
provided the foundation for four subsidiary companies which were meant to render
the services more competitively and efficiently.

The companies were officially

launched on 1st July 1998 and commenced full-fledged operations on 1st November
1998 under the names of: Azania Shipping Agency Company Ltd.
Oceanic Shipping Agency Company Ltd.
Victoria Shipping Agency Company Ltd.
Worldwide Shipping Agency Company Ltd.
The companies were under NASACO as a temporary holding company for the
duration of one year.
2.6.2 Privatisation.
The Parastatal Sector Reform Commission was to privatise the four companies by
sale of their respective majority shares to local and foreign interests after becoming
fully restructured. Out of the total government shares, 25% were to be sold to
shipping companies and 35% to Tanzanian nationals. 40% of the total shares were to
be retained for a short term to enable the Commission to determine the best way to
divest the services, based on government interest in the sector, and to ensure
protection of the national interest.
2.6.3 Liberalisation of agency services.
Full liberalisation of agency services was to be effected by issuance of licences to
any individuals or firms wishing to trade as a shipping agent subject to laid down
procedures so as to ensure fair trade practices, to protect the profession and to
safeguard national interests.
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However, before completion of the first phase, i.e. restructuring, the Minister
suddenly made a decision in January 1999 to freely issue shipping agency licences to
any interested person or firm. Issuance of a licence was supposed to be the last phase
of liberalisation of shipping agency services. By doing it earlier than planned, the
objective of the whole exercise in restructuring the company, which had already
incurred a huge amount of money was defeated.
Summary of Chapter Two:
From this Chapter it has been seen that, the liberalisation of agency services was not
undertaken according to the approved program.

NASACO needed time to

restructure its operation so as to become more responsive to the market, and to
satisfy client/needs. Time was also needed to improve the competitiveness of agency
services and prepare for competition. It was a mistake to open competition before
strengthening NASACO. Restructuring cannot be successful unless a number of
preliminary conditions are satisfied and proper strategies and procedures are
implemented. After all, the agency market in Tanzania is too small to justify the
need for many agency companies.
The following Chapter will look at the consequences of the hurried liberalisation of
the shipping agency sector.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.0 THE CONSEQUENCES:
One of the principles of trade liberalisation is to increase competition where possible
and to impose regulations where necessary. The objective of economic efficiency
was most likely to be achieved when a healthy competitive market could be created,
while appropriate regulations had a vital role to play when competition was not
feasible. It had to be through a competitive market only, that neutral, non-political
but binding procedures could be created which exclude the lazy and the inefficient,
and enforced the best practices and the adoption of new technology. Uncertain
outcomes had been foreseen in relation to phasing and integration of different
deregulation measures in a comprehensive liberalisation programme. It was the
government’s role therefore, to ensure a successful liberalisation through the
adoption of appropriate stabilisation policies.
In line with this thinking, the government decided to convert NASACO into four
legally and economically independent subsidiary companies with independent boards
of directors, so as to expose these companies to the same environment as the private
sector in order to stimulate economic efficiency. A gradual approach was considered
important for ensuring success without creating negative effects from privatisation.
The specific concern which argued for a gradual approach included a need to allow
time for entrepreneurial developments, and to convert the companies into
commercially run enterprises before being transferred to private sector. The aim was
for the government to retain its equity ownership only until the moment when the
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government share could be sold once the companies had secured market position and
become reasonably profitable.
The government also wanted to spread and democratise share ownership by
allocating a proportion of the shares to small investors and to employees so as to
create a new group of stakeholders for the wellbeing of the national economy. By so
doing this would have helped in: (i)

Mobilising domestic resources for investments, which might otherwise
have been held in non-productive forms.

(ii)

Gaining political support for privatisation by spreading the benefits of
privatisation.

(iii)

Demonstrating that privatisation did not benefit large foreign companies
only.

(iv)

Changing employees’ attitudes, improving management/labour relations
and enhancing productivity through share ownership of their company

The government’s plan was contradicted by an abrupt decision made by the Minister
of Trade and Industries, to issue licences to the country’s customers (foreign
shipping lines), to set up their own agencies and therefore serve themselves. It meant
that they were not obliged to employ locally owned agencies such as NASACO or
others. The collapse of NASACO and its newly formed subsidiaries was certain, the
government intention of promoting share ownership failed and a very serious labour
problem was created.
3.1. THE COLLAPSE OF NASACO.
3.1.1. Dar-es-Salaam branch.
The new subsidiary companies operated profitably for the first four months of the
operation i.e. from November 1998 to February 1999 before the issuance of agency
licences to new private companies totalling to 35 in number. By October 1999, three
of the subsidiary companies namely (Azania, Victoria and Worldwide) had already
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lost their principal business, the other subsidiary company (Oceanic) was on the
brink of loosing its principal shipping lines leaving it with only 35% of its principal
business. Thereafter the income kept on dropping as the shipping lines terminated
their contracts with the established companies
3.1.1.1 Azania Shipping Agency Company:
The major foreign shipping lines served by Azania Shipping Agency were the
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), Mitsui OSK Line (MOL), Global
Container Line (GCL) and Kenya National Shipping Line (KNSL)
MSC was the first line to terminate its contract with Azania in October 1999. MSC
was the most important customer to the company; its contract termination resulted in
a decrease in company income from an average of $100,000 per month in 1998/99 to
$14,000 1n October 1999.
MOL tendered its termination notice in November 1999; resulting in a further drop in
income from $14,000 in October to $380 earned in December. The company had
totally collapsed in December in the same year when KNSL issued its contract
termination notice.
3.1.1.2 Oceanic Shipping Agency Company:
The company was previously serving P&O Container Line (P&OCL), Pacific
International Lines (PIL), West European Container Line (WEC) as its major clients
plus Ellerman and Harrison. Among the shipping lines served by Oceanic, it was PIL
only, which established its in-house agency; other lines opted to use in-house
agencies of other shipping lines after terminating their contracts with Oceanic. The
company suffered a reduction in income from an average of $150,000 per month in
1998/99 to $56,437 earned in February 2000.
3.1.1.3 Victoria Shipping Agency Company:
The major principals of Victoria were Ignazio Messina Company, Nedlloyd Line,
and Laurel Navigator Line (LNL) as potential clients of the company plus Polish
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Ocean Line (POL), Deutfrancht Sereederei Rostock (DSR), and Jadroplov line. The
named important clients that contributed to about 90% of the company’s income all
withdrew from using the company agency services by establishing in-house agency
organisations. The company was badly financially affected; its income dropped from
an average of $90,000 per month in 1998/99 to $1058 recorded as an income for the
month of February 2000.
3.1.1.4 World wide Shipping Agency Company:
The Worldwide Shipping Agency company was serving the shipping lines of
Maersk, CMBT/DOAL, NYK, DAL and K- line.
The company’s performance was very good; it was earning an average of US$
400,000 per month. In December 1998, the company realised an income of US$
518,835, while in February 1999 the income was US$ 415,313.
Maersk line was the first shipping line to terminate its contract with the Worldwide
Shipping Agency Company in May 1999. The termination resulted in a decrease of
income to US$ 240,888 in the month of June.
CMBT/DOAL (as one line) shipping line terminated its contract in September 1999,
a situation that resulted in the company realising an income of US$ 109,342 for the
month of October.
Maersk and CMBT/DOAL shipping lines were the major clients of the company, the
withdrawal of these companies, affected the company’s earnings, which dropped to
US$ 38,734 in the February 2000. The situation continued to get worse because
other shipping lines decided to use agency services rendered by new agency
companies operated by shipping lines.
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3.1.1.5 Summary of the performance impact:
The financial performance of four subsidiary companies, kept on deteriorating to an
extent of failing to pay salaries timely. Both companies resolved to downsize their
workforce by an average range of 85%. Unfortunately the decision could not be
implemented to date because of insufficient funds to finance the redundancy. This
would suggest that the government was not well prepared for liberalisation.
The performance of the four subsidiary companies is reflected in (Fig 1) below.
Fig 1.
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Source: Operation reports of the four companies: Dec 1998 –Feb. 2000.
3.1.2. Tanga branch:
The main liner callers to Tanga port were Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC),
P&O Nedlloyd and Mitsui OSK, however the latter operated on slots of P&O
Nedlloyd. MSC and P&O Nedlloyd obtained their own shipping agency licences
during the first half of 1999. MSC tendered an agency termination notice with
NASACO in August 1999 and commenced operating in Tanga from October 1999.
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P&O Nedlloyd tendered its notice late September 1999 and started operations on 14th
December 1999.

These development dictated the closure of NASACO- Tanga

agency business.
3.1.3. Mtwara branch:
The branch depended mostly on chartered vessels, which called at the port during the
crop-picking season; this is between the months of August to December every year.
P&O Nedlloyd and Mitsui OSK started operating at Mtwara during the 1999 crop
season and received agency services rendered by NASACO. The two companies
projected more future shipments as the result of the projected cargo for the
Mchuchuma coalmines and the Mtwara corridor development. It was strongly felt
that Mtwara had potential for doing business competitively at least until the next crop
season.
3.1.4. Tramp shipping and other services:
A considerable volume of tramp shipping agency business was taken up by other
licensed competitors leaving NASACO with only 15% of the tramp business.
However, the company still has a container depot which is being used by the
shipping lines and 13 warehouses rented to exporters and importers. The company
has a clearing and forwarding department, which handles cargo not only for Tanzania
but also for Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Republic of Congo.
It has to be noted that, the shipping lines used NASACO container depot as part of
their respective agency agreements between the two parties. In the absence of such
agreements and in the presence of privately owned depots around the area, the
shipping lines are no longer obliged to use these services. NASACO’s container
depot business therefore, is also facing a dilemma.
3.2. IN-HOUSE AGENCIES:
In- house agencies are shipping agency organisations operated by the shipping lines
to serve their own ships. Major shipping lines such as Maersk, P&O Nedlloyd,
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Mediterranean Shipping Company, CMBT/ Surfmarine and others all established inhouse agencies in the country. Among the objectives of having their own agencies,
was to ensure dedication to one principal, which gave them better control, unlike
NASACO which, as a sole agent, was serving all shipping lines and tramp ships
under one roof. Within one year of in-house agency operations commencing, among
other developments, shippers and ship owners had observed the following:
The shipping lines were now able to offer their customers consistent and better
quality services. As commented by Tanzania branch manager of Seaforth, a Kenya
based company that, “The level of competency has increased substantially. A strong
competition between the agents is now focused on how fast the agent is able to get
the access of the dilapidated port equipment to work on their vessels. In the past the
sense of urgency was not evident”. (Lloyds’ list 2000).
The customers were satisfied with the quick and effective response to problems, as
the result of the speed and ability to pass on relevant information, and instant
decision-making.

The focus on customer care increased so as to create strong

customer relations, unlike an independent agent (NASACO) who spent little time on
customer care and contact, and too much time and money, focusing on back-office
related matters. Sometimes they were more loyal to local clients than to ship owners.
By having in-house agencies, they solved the problem of delays in freight transfers
and in disbursement submissions to principals.
The argument that NASACO was inefficient, as a reason for the shipping lines to
have in-house agencies, was not substantiated. With liberalisation of the sector, ship
operators were free to select any efficient independent agency company other than
NASACO. The foremost important reason was that, liner shipping was no longer a
profitable business as it had been in past years. The real squeeze on profits had
forced the shipping lines to take a hard look at their independent agents. The
shipping lines, having decided to impose closer controls on costs, were no longer
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able to pay 2.5% to 5% for commission plus container handling charges to their
independent agents. As Danny Rees of Quadrant container lines said “ We use the
in-house subsidiary of the group, it allows us to keep the profit within the group”.
(The Ship’s Agent, 1998).
Some of the shipping lines argue that by having their own organisations, they have
direct control, and can hire and fire as they wish. But it was further argued that the
closer they get to Europe, the harder it becomes, because of the employment rules on
that continent. In case of Tanzania this was not an obstacle to them, recognising that
issuance of the licences was unconditional.
3.3. UNFAIR COMPETITION:
The decision to liberalise shipping agency sector was inevitable and it was accepted
as a viable approach to improve efficiency through a fair competition. The problem
was in the way the liberalisation exercise was undertaken. It was, and will continue
to be quite impossible for an independent agency company, to compete with a ship
owner operating his own agency, taking into account that the market had been
dominated by liner vessels.
It had been noted that the main beneficiaries of the hurriedly liberalised shipping
agency market were the foreign shipping lines operating in-house shipping agency
companies.

Major shipping lines owning agency companies, would co-operate

among themselves on the basis of their common interests to shape the industry to
their wishes, cut tariff down to the levels at which other competitors could not be
able to operate and therefore drive them out of the business.

Under such

circumstances it would be impossible, to have fair competition between local and
foreign agency companies, or in other words, between agencies owned by ship
owners and non-owner agency companies (locals).

While shipping lines are

continuing to handle their vessels, other non-owner companies continue to scramble
for the few tramps vessels calling to Tanzanian ports.
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The entrance of the multinational shipping lines in a small market was to kill small
operators. Up to December 1999, out of thirty-five newly licensed companies, about
half of them had never handled a single ship. Natural deaths of those companies had
been foreseen.
An example of unfair competition was reported by the chairman of Uganda Clearing
and Forwarding Association that, small freight forwarders have already closed down
while others were forced to merge with big firms, following the entrance into the
market of three multinational shipping firms ( Maersk Shipping Line, Mackenzie
Forwarders and Transami ).

The chairman of the Association of Clearing,

Warehousing and Freight Forwarders of Kenya also claimed that, the survival of
local freight forwarders companies was threatened by the government’s move to
allow international shipping lines operating in Kenya, to start freight divisions.
(Ouma, 2000). Both parties appealed to their respective governments to come up
with new legislation to curb unfair competition by multinational shipping lines.
.
3.4. LACK OF CONTROL:
The liberalisation of the shipping agency sector was mainly based on the study
mentioned in the previous chapter on restructuring of NASACO. Apart from the
proposed new structure, the team recommended regulations through which the
agency services had to be rendered. The team recommended regulations to be used
in each restructuring phase of the shipping agency services in the country as follows:
3.4.1. Entry regulations – restructuring phase:
The government was to retain the existing entry and licensing restrictions in shipping
agency services. Thus only the holding company and its subsidiaries would have
been licensed to carry out shipping agency business in the country.
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3.4.2. Company structure and ownership – privatisation phase:
The company structure and ownership would have remained as in the first phase, but
the government would have allocated more of its shares in the subsidiary companies
to indigenous Tanzanian nationals up to the total of 49%.
3.4.3. Entry regulations – liberalisation phase:
Entry restrictions into the shipping agency business were to be liberalised, to allow
enterprises to be licensed, subject to:
(i)

The enterprise allowing a minimum ownership participation of 75% by
Tanzanian nationals.

(ii)

The enterprise demonstrating its ability to render good agency services
It was the government’s intention to impose entry restrictions to limit the
number of the players because of the size of the market itself. 75% local
participation in agency companies was proposed by study group, but this was
not be possible, because a foreign investor would not accept to invest where
he would have no voting power.

3.4.4. Other regulations:
(i)

The government was to initiate measures for the establishment of a code of
conduct for shipping agents, to ensure that certain internationally accepted
professional standards were met and incidents of maritime fraud were
minimised.

(ii)

The government was to set up a tariff board responsible for determining
the tariff for the shipping agency.

(iii)

The government was to ensure that all enterprises in the country would not
be engaged in harmful and conflicting behaviour, or abuse the dominant
positions they would have acquired.
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Before the second phase the Minister of Transport and Communication was to put in
place a code of conduct and competition rules for shipping sector. Non of the
recommended regulations was taken into account in liberalising agency services.
The role of government in a free market system is to formulate laws so as to enforce
contracts and safeguard properties. Without a legal framework to enforce contracts,
private business activity will not work.

A stronger private sector and stronger

markets cannot be attained without certain fundamentals related to the administrative
system, such as adherence to the rule of law, maintenance of competition and
preventing the emergence of monopolies. A desirable economic reform therefore is
that which opens opportunities for private entries into a closed sector of the
economy, but if that entry is left to the discretion of public officials rather than
allowing an open competitive process, enormous scope for corruption is created.
For example, Guinea privatised 158 public enterprises between 1985 and 1992, but
the change proceeded without a clear programme or legal framework or procedures
for competition. Bidding and accounting procedures were not made clear, assets
were sold for much less than their value, and the successful bidders were offered
terms, which sometimes included monopoly licences. (World Bank, 1995).
In developing countries like Tanzania, participation of foreign investors has been
allowed in their privatisation programmes, this was partly due to the limited
availability of domestic financial resources to finance privatisation.

Another

important policy consideration was that, foreign participation would bring not only
capital, but also management skills, new technology and global or international
linkages.
Foreign participation can range from joint ventures to acquisition of majority or
minority interests in the privatised enterprises. In some countries foreign investors
have been involved in a large proportion of privatised enterprises, while other
countries have placed limits on foreign participation in privatised enterprises. For
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example in Argentina, 60% of the assets sold up to the year 1995, were bought by
foreign investors, while in Niger all privatised companies were sold to domestic
investors (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD],
1995).
In general, the limits for foreign investment, could only be exceeded where expertise
needed to improve efficiency was not available locally, where foreign participation
was required to improve exports, where the supply of local capital was insufficient to
absorb shares offered and where the nature of the business required global linkages
and international exposure.
There are also special conditions attached to privatisation of public enterprises,
which differ from one country to another. For example, retention of a special, or
“golden” share by the government in order to protect the business from unwelcome
take over or to provide an opportunity for the management to adjust themselves to a
private sector culture.
In the Republic of Korea, in order to prevent foreign investors from monopolising
the financial sector, a ceiling was placed on the ownership of shares in the privatised
banks, whereby a maximum of 5% for firms and a maximum of 500 shares for
individual investors were agreed. In New Zealand, in order to promote wide spread
ownership and to avoid the situations where minority shareholders of companies
would object to sales, new owners were required to float shares within a given period
of time as a condition of sale. In Sri Lanka, foreign investors were not allowed to
transfer a recently acquired enterprise to another foreign investor without
government approval. (UNCTAD, 1995).
Even employee protection schemes and pension plans may also form some of the
conditions attached to privatisation.
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The priority of the whole exercise was to increase competition, not to transfer the
productive activities to foreign participants. Deregulation, in the sense of removal of
market entry restrictions, needed to be accompanied by a regulatory mechanism to
control anti-competitive behaviour, because deregulation could work well if there
was no concentration of power or unfair trade practices. A good example is of
Microsoft of the United States. Even though there is free trade in USA, but the
expansion of Microsoft is so enormous to an extent of dominating the market and
undermines other players, this needs a government law to handle such cases. In case
of Tanzania therefore, foreign investment should have been subject to closer scrutiny
by the public and be handled with greater attention to national interests and concerns.
The issuance of unconditional shipping agency licenses was totally against the
recommendations made by the study team
Summary of Chapter Three:
We have seen that liberalisation of agency services had both positive and negative
results. Positive results were an increased efficiency in performance especially in
new agency companies operated by shipping lines, which resulted in fast cargo
clearance from ports for the benefit of Tanzanian shippers. On the other hand, the
process was not in favour of local companies dependant on shipping lines as their
principals. The Chapter makes clear that, if the shipping lines decide to merge and
use one agent, one company will dominate the market. Liberalisation of shipping
agency services therefore will mean a transfer of a state monopoly to the private
hands.
The following Chapter will examine the correctness of the policy and its implications
for shipping agency sector.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
4.0.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATION.

As discussed in Chapter One, the government originally decided to put all strategic
commercial activities and key sectors of the economy into the public sector through a
policy of socialism and nationalisation. That situation led to the establishment of
State-owned enterprises in all sectors of the economy.

These enterprises faced

various problems with time and it turned out to be impossible for the government to
manage its investments in these enterprises without both financial and managerial
difficulties. The situation resulted in a major Government Issue and a decision to
make a change in the policy.
The concerns that had originally justified the creation of the large public enterprises
did not vanish. The restructuring of the public sector was to ensure that the same
objectives were achieved through a market based economy.

The reform was

intended to step up economic growth, to reduce the large number of non-performing
public enterprises and to eliminate any budgetary support being extended to them. A
meaningful reform was vital, and was at the core of macro-economic adjustment.
This Chapter will analyse the policy and its implementation by looking at how the
government’ objectives of liberalising agency sector were achieved.
4.1.

THE CORRECTNESS OF THE POLICY.

The correctness of any privatisation policy depends on the approach used to
formulate the privatisation program, its implementation and the achievement of the
prescribed objectives.

The government had addressed all these fundamental
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principles in formulating into privatisation policy, and, in so doing, demonstrated its
commitment to implementing the Policy.

The government devised a program,

prepared the legal framework and set up the institutional environment i.e.
privatisation agencies (PSRC). Enterprises identified for privatisation were listed,
stakeholders were identified and the method to be used was prescribed.

The

government through the PSRC established a dialogue to seek national consensus on
the program.
In support of this approach, the government published a master plan as an official
blue print of the Parastatal Reform and Privatisation Program. The master plan was
explained in simple language so that everybody could understand the objectives and
targets of the program.

In theory, the conditions for a successful privatisation

process were in place.
In order to be able to assess the success of the liberalisation initiative we have to
remind ourselves as to what were government’ expectations from the exercise.
The general expectations from any privatisation process are:
(i)

To raise additional revenue for the state.

(ii)

To promote economic efficiency.

(iii)

To develop national capital markets.

(iv)

To introduce competition through economic liberalisation.

(v)

To gain social benefits for society.

These will be discussed in turn.
4.1.1.

To raise additional revenue for the state.

In principal privatisation should improve government finances. This improvement
can be either through the sale of assets and shares, or by reducing the need for
operating subsidies and investment capital. In many cases, additional investments
can result in increased capacity of production, quality of services, transfer of
technology and know-how, product diversification and expanded markets. In areas
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where the investments are coupled with changes in management and labour
practices, there can be a rise in turn over, lower operating costs and better financial
outcomes.
In 1990, 270 public enterprises were processed for privatisation out of the
government target of 395 enterprises. $300 million in revenue was raised from more
than 100 outright sales. The industrial sector contribution to the GDP increased from
10.6% in 1996 to 12.3 % in 1997. The manufacturing sector which accounts for 23%
and 35% of the government revenue and employment in the sector respectively,
increased by 2% (Kyaruzi, 2000).
Economic reform in Tanzania has succeeded in reducing the inflation rate to 6.3 per
cent as of February 2000, from double digits only a few years ago. The Gross
Domestic Product has grown at an average real rate of 4.2% and the annual per
capita income has risen to $210 from $180 (Chege, W. Reuters. 2000).
However, the sale proceeds depends on the value of the enterprises sold. The
following table shows a number of transactions of sales and the amount realised.
Tanzania had 124 transactions and realised $132 million only as sales value
compared to 7 transactions in South Africa that realised a total of $2,209million. This
means that, enterprises sold by Tanzania were of low value. This is one of the
problems of privatisation in developing countries. Generally privatisation took place
in quite unfavourable conditions resulted in lower revenue being realised. Buyers
were allowed to bid at low prices, in addition to that, governments have to incur huge
liabilities left by the sold enterprises and pay the labour-force reduced by the buyer.
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Table 4
Ten top African countries in sales value
Country

Total transactions

Total sales in

1993-1997

US $ million.

South Africa

7

2,209

Ghana

219

555

Côte d’ Ivoire

47

357

Senegal

50

262

Nigeria

81

207

Mozambique

549

201

Kenya

155

186

Zambia

217

180

Uganda

88

134

Tanzania

124

132

Source: The World Bank, African Development Indicators 1998/1999

4.1.2. To promote economic efficiency:
Economic efficiency is at the heart of the objective of privatisation.

The

government’s expectation from privatisation was to attain higher efficiency, that is
higher output, more investments, higher profits, higher employment, lower leverage
and higher dividends. Various studies conducted on privatised enterprises, found
strong evidence that, after privatisation, the sample enterprises became more
profitable, increased their real sales and investment spending, reduced their debt
levels, increased dividends payments and increased employment (Table 5).
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Table 5.
Post privatisation performance: key results for 79 privatised.
enterprises in 21 developing countries 1980-1992.
Indicator
Profitability:
Returns on sales
Efficiency:
Real sales per employee
Investment:
Capital expenditure/sales
Output:
Real sales
Total employment
Leverage
Debt/Total assets
Dividend pay out:
Dividends/sales

Average change in %.
+124
+25
+126
+25
+1.3
-5
+44

Source: Narjess Baukari and Jean Claude Cosset. The financial and Operating
Performance of Newly privatised firms.

4.1.3. Capital market development:
At the beginning, a large percentage of privatisation transactions took place outside
the formal capital markets.

More recently, the privatisation of State enterprises

through sale of shares by public offerings has been one cause of the increased
number of quoted companies on stock exchange markets. The need to trade shares
led to the opening of a stock exchange in many countries including Tanzania. For
example, the Tanzania Breweries Company was the first company placed in a stock
exchange market. In 1999, the Company made Tsh. 26 billion profit, of which 25%
remained in the hands of local shareholders. Sri Lanka is another example where the
share-owning population has risen from around 9000 in 1989 to over 50,000 in 1991
(UNCTAD, 1995). The increase was the result of providing free shares to employees
of the privatised enterprises.
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Experience has shown that transfer of ownership is the most difficult decision to be
taken by the government. The government may decide to retain majority ownership
through share dilution, joint venture and management contracts. The government
may also decide to own a minority share in a privatised enterprise, in most cases for
political reasons. Broadening of ownership has been politically and socially popular,
it may be used to create desire and expectation among the management and
employees for better productivity in the privatised enterprise, even though it may not
provide new blood in the form of investment, know-how, new products and
extension of the markets. Foe example in 1983, ABP (19 UK ports) were privatised
with most employees owning at least 1000 shares, since then labour productivity
increased by 40% (Alderton. 2000).
4.1.4.

To introduce competition:

Stimulating competition is an attractive aspect of the liberalisation process.
Competition can provide a powerful incentive to reduce and stabilise prices. In a
competitive market, the public enterprise that does not operate in accordance with
consumer demand, or overprices its products can easily loose its customers, while
failure to match the performance of its competitors may result in a loss of market
share and a deteriorating financial performance. Competition can be achieved either
through out-right sale or through deregulation to allow the entry of new competitors.
4.1.5

To gain social benefits:

Apart from employment, social objectives of privatisation also include consumer
interests and welfare considerations such as -:
(i)

Privatisation is expected to raise economic welfare by improving efficiency
and thus raising the rate of economic growth for the benefit of the entire
society.

(ii)

Privatisation is expected to achieve a more equitable distribution of the
benefits of economic growth among all sections of the population. The main
concern here is to improve the standard of living.
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(iii)

There are specific distribution objectives of privatisation which include
widening and deepening share ownership and control of productive sectors,
promoting decentralisation, regional and rural development, improving
employment and improving social services and infrastructure,

(iv)

There are participatory objectives. These allow employees to actively
participate and engage in the economy as entrepreneurs or share-owning
employees in the enterprise they work for, and this can help to prevent labour
opposition to privatisation. The equity participation can also lead to
efficiency gains.

When the government decided to pursue its reforms in shipping agency sector, it had
the same objectives, namely to boost up the national economy through a free market
environment. Unfortunately the results have not been as good as expected even
though there is an improvement in the performance. The problem is not in the policy
itself, but its implementation. The actual implementation was totally against what
was stipulated in the government directive. The following discussion will look at the
results of the liberalisation of agency sector.
Positive impact:
One of the positive results of the process is increased efficiency. It has been evident
that efficiency had improved to a remarkable extent. Fast documentation, fast and
reliable communication and fast decision making has resulted in fast responses to
queries. Most of the service users have expressed their satisfaction and confidence
with the new agency companies. This was strongly verified by Mr. Alex Adams of
CMBT, who said, “ they could now give importers and exporters a far better service.
The actual cost to the lines did not appear to be less since the port charges, fee and
the likes were unchanged”. (Lloyd’s List 2000. Tanzania reforms agencies). The
efficiency in agency services enables shippers to clear their cargo faster than before.
Faster clearance avoids storage charges to shippers and also limits the possibility of
cargo being stolen while in the port.
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Container demurrage was one of the problems faced by NASACO as an agent. Poor
container monitoring and tracking resulted in an increased number of overdue
containers used by local shippers and those from neighbouring land locked countries.
Overdue containers attracted a huge amount of money as demurrage charges paid to
shipping lines in foreign currency. By the end of 1999, a total of US $ 13,264,039
accumulated as outstanding demurrage charges payable to shipping lines.
Liberalisation of agency services solves this problem because most of the shipping
lines have computerised container-monitoring activities.
In the new structure where the carrier is also an agent, there is direct contact between
the shipper and the carrier. This provides an opportunity for the shipper to negotiate
directly with the carrier for better transport terms especially the freight rate. If a
shipper can get lower freight rates the total cost of his products will be lower and as a
result he will sell it at a competitive price, the final beneficiary of the entire
transaction will be the final consumer. Liberalisation of agency services therefore
may contribute to the competitiveness of Tanzanian shippers and consignees.
There were costs which shipping lines were charged by NASACO apart from
commission, namely car hire (for crew), boat hire and medical facilities, the costs
which were eventually considered in freight calculations payable by shippers. For
in-house agency organisations, shippers can be relieved from these costs because the
costs will be part of normal office running expenses and not directly attached to
cargo.
Such advantages, however, need to be supported by other related facilities such as
port facilities, customs, inland transport and cargo handling facilities for economic
development. In fact, most of the service users, especially those from land locked
countries, diverted their cargo to the ports of Mombassa and Maputo not because of
the inefficiency of shipping agency services, but because they were dissatisfied with
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the ports, customs and inland infrastructure. This was also reported in the Lloyds
special report, namely that working on bulk cargo in Dar-es-Salaam port was not too
problematic, as long as the documentation preceded the cargo arrival. However
getting the cargo out of the port and to its inland destination often presented a
significant headache.

Neither the Tanzania Railway Corporation nor its sister

operation under Tazara, which runs between Dar-es-Salaam and Zambia, had
sufficient rail wagons. Good performance of the shipping agency alone cannot have
a marked impact on the economy.
Negative impact:
NASACO was one of the public enterprises whose financial performance for the past
twenty years was very good, making it one of the principal sources of the State
income. So far the government has gained nothing forthcoming from the process
because NASACO was neither sold nor entered into joint venture, which means that
there was nothing as sale proceeds. In the new structure where the shipping lines are
operating their own in-house shipping agency organisations, it means they are now
producers and consumers of the agency services. It further implies that the
transactions between the principal and the agent have become an internal matter, and
also an opportunity for them to understate revenue and inflate expenses to minimise
profits. Taking into account of the intensity of corruption that has weakened tax
enforcement, it is a conducive environment for tax evasion by the shipping lines.
If so far as the shipping lines were investors, there was nothing the government could
benefit out of it. The basic investments needed to start a shipping agency business
are no more than a couple of offices, furniture, a telephone, fax machine, a computer
and a company car, a cost that a Tanzanian national could afford. After all these are
facilities that most of the lines already have through their local representatives.
While privatisation has been aimed at raising additional revenue for the state, the
restructuring of shipping agencies in the country will reduce State revenue by Tsh.
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3.5 billion. This is the amount needed to finance the retrenchment of 650 employees
who have lost their jobs. The government is planning to sell buildings owned by
NASACO to meet the cost.
In comparing the efficiency of the public and private enterprises, it must be clear that
respective management operates in different environments with different objectives.
NASACO as a public enterprise was designed to be part of the government but also
to operate commercially. It had other government objectives beyond the goal of
maximising profits. An overall controller of the operations was the Minister who
had political goals that may not necessarily have been related to the performance of
the enterprise. He was somehow responsible for both commercial performance in the
market place as well as political performance, balancing the two goals in practice
was very difficult and this led to problems. Political interference and limited
operational autonomy created an environment that was not conducive to commercial
excellence of the enterprise. Unlike private companies where the management and
control is under the owners, the owners could create incentives for employees who
serve for their (the owners) interests, and get the feeling that they were part of the
company. In fact, ownership matters less than institutional design and resource
allocation. Inefficiency of the public enterprise is not the result of the ownership it
has been the result of the structure of its control processes of the management,
including their relations with the government”(Ahron, 1986).
If NASACO had been given more autonomy, been exposed to competitive pressures
and market discipline, without political interference, its performance could have been
as good as any private company.
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the company shares were to be issued to
NASACO employees, shipping lines and to the general public. The issuance was to
take place as a second phase in the restructuring, i.e. the privatisation phase. Share
ownership for the employees would have been an important incentive to them. The
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feeling of ownership would have stimulated efficiency in performance. The general
public would have benefited by the share ownership as exemplified by the case of
Tanzania Breweries Company. Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world;
share ownership was received with high expectation that it would reduce the
economic hardship faced by most of its people.
The privatisation phase was not reached as planned due to premature liberalisation of
the sector; nor was the government’s intention of capital market development and
broadening of ownership attained from shipping agency restructuring.

The

government failed to realise for taxpayers the benefits of privatisation with regard to
share ownership. In Britain for example, where privatisation has probably gone
further than in most countries and where the living standards of its people are far
better than in Tanzania, the proportion of households owning shares in privatised
enterprises has risen from 10% in 1979 to about 40% in 1987. (Cook & Kirkparick.
1988). From what has happened in Tanzania, it is clear that government has again
failed to realise for the public the social benefits (participatory objective of
privatisation) of liberalising the shipping agency services.
The success of economic liberalisation is through competition promoted by
competitive markets and competition policies. The competition needs to be fair; i.e.
all players must have an equal opportunity to access the business. What happened in
this case was to transfer monopoly power from the public to private hands. There
was pressure from the shipping lines to operate in-house agency organisations, as in
the case of various places in Europe, but Tanzania was too far behind for that. The
trade was dominated by liner shipping, if the shipping lines opted for self-service, the
local companies would have nothing to trade on. The volume of cargo does not
justify operating the in-house agencies. There is high unemployment rate, low per
capita income and no social service policies when compared to most European
countries. In Tanzania where each person is relying on his own efforts, to allow the
shipping lines to operate their own agencies means that there will be an increase in
unemployment rate, a reduction in tax-payers and a reduction in purchasing power.
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One might have expected that the new companies would have absorbed a number of
ex-NASACO employees but that was not the case. Maersk for example has a
tradition of recruiting its own employees; they only took one employee from
NASACO out of six who were working for the line. Half of the labour force of
NASACO have lost their jobs so far, and the other half are still at the office working
(there is no work), it is only because the government has no money for (redundancy)
pay. In such situation how can living standards be raised through privatisation?
Privatisation may affect employment conditions as well as relations between
employees and management, especially in the post-privatisation phase. Privatisationrelated social problems are likely be most acute in circumstances where employees’
issues have not been given adequate attention in the preparation and implementation
of the privatisation program.

It is therefore essential that social considerations

occupy the central place in the design and implementation of privatisation policies
and that the objectives be incorporated in the privatisation strategy at the beginning
of the process rather than as an after-thought.
If NASACO had been given the opportunity to compete with other independent
shipping agencies, it would have had a better chance to prove its competence through
its long-experienced employees in the field. Shipping lines would have had the right
to appoint any agent from the market who was competent, and terminate the contract
whenever he become inefficient. In this way shipping agency business would have
been still under Tanzanian management, and efficiency would have been improved
through fair competition.
Privatisation requires a review of a country’s legal system and the legal status of the
public enterprises, in order to determine whether there are particular legal issues such
as ownership rights or problems arising from the transfer of a public enterprise to the
private sector. Equally important is a review of the legal structure and the nature of
the public enterprise included in the privatisation program. There must be a general
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legislation for the entire privatisation program and also specific legislation for each
enterprise. The specific legislation has an advantage that if raises the possibility of
tailoring the legislation to the specificity of the entity being privatised. Another
advantage is that it can speed up the process, because privatisation normally involves
intense political debate, not only on the legislation, but also on the privatisation
program itself.
In case of liberalisation as in the NASACO situation, law reform is required in
several areas.
(i)

Trade legislation with respect to rules on tariffs, import and export controls.

(ii)

Legislation regarding the protection of emerging industries (especially in
developing countries).

(iii)

Rules on foreign investment, ownership and taxation.

(iv)

Rules on foreign exchange and banking.

(v)

Intellectual property rights (both in terms of international and national laws)

(vi)

Price liberalisation legislation.

(vii)

Non-discrimination between the private and public sector.

(viii) Labour laws must be sufficiently flexible to allow new owners to undertake
any organisational restructuring in order to improve the economic efficiency
of the enterprise, review regulations and conditions of employment, review
the minimum working standards so as to safeguard the interests of workers,
and review compensation rules for loss of employment and pension schemes.
As regards the law reforms, the government has established two government legal
documents so as to accommodate the changes, The Act on Fair Trade Practices and a
Code of Conduct for shipping agents.
4.2

FAIR TRADE PRACTICES :

The Act on Fair Trade Practices is a government Act established to encourage
competition in the economy by prohibition of restrictive trade practices, regulation of
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monopolies or concentration of economic power and prices for the protection of
consumers, and to provide for other matters. It was enacted by the parliament of the
United Republic of Tanzania in 1994 and will come into force on a date that the
Minister, by notice, publishes it in the government gazette. In this respect it is not yet
in force.
In liberalising the shipping agency sector, a Fair Trade Practices Act is essential to
give guidelines on eliminating the existing state monopoly, to promote fair
competition and to protect shippers and consignees as service users. On reviewing
various sections of the Act, one can see that, if the Act had been in force during the
liberalisation of the shipping agency sector, there would have been a different
outcome from that which actually happened.
Part 3 of the Act includes provisions relating to “Restrictive Trade Practices. The
Act defines Restrictive Trade Practice as:
An act performed by one or more persons engaged in production or
distribution of goods or services, which, in respect of other persons offering
the skills, motivation and minimum seed capital required, in order to compete
at fair market prices in any field of production or distribution of goods and
services, reduces or eliminates their opportunities so to participate.
Any person who is deemed to have committed a restrictive trade practice, (section.
26, subsect. 2) must desist immediately from that trade practice, and may also be
required to take certain positive steps to assist existing or potential suppliers,
competitors, or customers in order to compensate for the past effects of that practice.
By looking at this section, it is clear that the opportunity given to the shipping lines
to operate their own agency offices, reduced or eliminated the opportunity for the
independent shipping agents to participate in the business. As reported by Lloyd’s
special reports, out of thirty-five agencies, only about ten were conducting business
of any scale, most of which were allied to, or owned by, the major shipping lines that
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called at Tanzania ports. That meant that twenty-four independent agents were
eliminated from the liner agency business.
There was a fear among the independent agents that the shipping lines might cooperate on the basis of their common interest to shape the industry to their wishes.
For example they could easily cut the tariff down to levels where other companies
could not operate and they could eventually be driven away (predatory trade
practice). The government saw that possibility. (Section 20) states that:
Any person who, whether as a principal or an agent or whether by himself or
his agent, commits a predatory trade practice with the intention, whether
exclusively or in common with other objects, of accomplishing any of the
purposes such as to drive a competitor out of the business or to deter a person
from establishing a competitive business in the country or in any specific area
or location within the country. Or to induce a competitor to desist from
producing or trading in any goods or services, or deter a person from
producing or trading in any goods or services.
According to the Act, predatory trade practice is an offence. Section 20:4 of the Act,
states that any person who commits such an offence is liable on conviction to a fine
not exceeding Tsh. three million or to the imprisonment for a term not exceeding
twelve months.
In section 32, the Minister has been allowed to keep under review the structure of
production and distribution of goods and services in the country, to determine
whether concentration of economic power exists where its detrimental impact on the
economy, out weighs any efficiency advantages.
In section 32:4 it is stated.
“ Concentration of an economic power shall be deemed to be prejudicial to the public
interest if its effect is to reduce or limit unreasonably the competition in the
production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of services”. According
to the Act, concentration of economic power is an offence. The commissioner has
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the power to remove the unwarranted concentration of economic power from any
company or an organization by disposing his interests in production or distribution,
or the provision of services.
The Fair Trade Practices Act is absolutely essential because Consumers and small
producers need to be protected from big players who could easily misuse their
dominating power.
4.3 CODE OF CONDUCT AND ITS PURPOSES:
In advanced economies, the shipping agency sector is no longer regulated, but is
covered in the United Nations convention that seeks to monitor and regulate
professional conduct, and qualifications and financial responsibility. UNCTAD had
seen that it was desirable to establish a set of rules governing the conduct and
qualifications of shipping agents given their important role in the shipping agency
business.

The main areas identified in the minimum standards established by

UNCTAD were(i)

Education and professional expertise

(ii)

Financial reliability

(iii)

Professional conduct

.
The objectives of the minimum standards were: (i)

To uphold a high standard of business ethics and professional conduct

(ii)

To promote a high level of professional education and experience

(iii)

To encourage operation of financially sound and stable shipping agents

(iv)

To provide guidelines for national authorities and professional associations to
establish and maintain a sound agency system.

In compliance with the last objective of UNCTAD’s minimum standards of shipping
agents, the government established a Code of Conduct for shipping agents. The
Code was aimed at regulating shipping agency services and monitoring the
maintenance of professional ethics in the new structure of the sector. Once again,
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when the shipping agency sector was liberalised; the Code of Conduct was not in
force. It meant that, new agency companies were not subject to the requirements of
the proposed Code.
Some of the provisions on the proposed Code were: (i)

Restrictions on the registration and licensing of shipping agents (Cap 212,
Sect 12.) States that

“ no shipping agent shall, after the coming into

operation of this Act, be licensed and registered as a shipping agent unless the
shipping agent -.
(a) is a resident of Tanzania
(b) is a body corporate and incorporated under the company ordinance.
(c) has not less than fifty per cent of the controlling interest whether in
terms of shares, paid up capital, or the citizens of Tanzania hold
voting rights.
(ii)

Capital requirement. ( Sect 13)
(a) The Minister shall, upon the recommendation of the director, by order
published in the government gazette, prescribe the minimum paid in
share capital to be maintained by the shipping agent
(b) The Minister may, from time to time, by order published in the
government gazette, vary the minimum paid up share capital
prescribed under sub-section (i).

(iii)

Margin of solvency (Sect.14)
Any person or company carrying on business as a shipping agent shall at all
times while carrying on such business, maintain a margin of solvency of not
less than the amount that the Minister shall by regulation publish in the
gazette.

(iv)

Application of the licence. (Sect. 16)

(v)

Other regulations. (sect. 30 :1)

The Minister may make regulations in respect of: -
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(a) The qualifications required of the shipping agents for the application of a licence.
(b) The period, for which terms and conditions subject to which licences may be
granted.
(c) The standards to be observed by the shipping agents and the prohibition of acts or
omissions in the contravention of such standards.
It would have been more meaningful if the Code had been in force during the
liberalisation of the shipping agency sector. The new companies were given licenses
unconditionally, the only requirement being a cash bond of Tsh.500.000 for each
new company.

Professional skills and experience were not included as basic

requirements, and as a result, there was an influx of unprofessional people who were
given licences, ranging from army officers to government administrators. There was
no legal instrument by which an agent could be held liable for professional
misconduct. How could professionals (shipping lines) possibly compete with
unprofessional (local companies excluding NASACO) on the same playing field?
This was an added advantage to the shipping lines, whose goal was to phase out local
independent agents,
The establishment of the Fair Trade Practices Act and the Code of Conduct for
Shipping Agents, were two of the government’s steps to create an enabling
environment for privatisation the process. These were two instruments that were
supposed to be enforced along with privatisation. The Minister’s premature decision
to liberalise the shipping agency services without enforcing the two instruments was
one of the major shortcomings in restructuring the agency services. The Secretary of
Tanzania Shippers Council cautioned the government through his letter to the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industries in saying that, quoted:
There is no need to hurry in liberalising the business without the Shipping
Agency Act, which is essential, as far as maritime fraud and cheating is
concerned in the shipping industry. The liberalisation of the shipping agency
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business without an Agency Act will cause shippers and the nation to incur
unnecessary costs, which could have been avoided, if the Act was in place.
It was also reported in the Lloyds list special report that there was an unwritten
agreement between the lines that were running their own agencies and the Tanzanian
government that they (the shipping lines) would not handle third party work in the
initial stage. The report further narrated that, although not in writing, there was an
agreement to offer a helping hand to various local agencies, including NASACO, to
become established in the industry. However this help was not expected to last
forever. (Lloyds’s List 2000. Tanzania transforms agency). It is unconscionable how
a government could act against its own formulated policies and interest. Nobody
should expect a government to enter into an unwritten agreement with foreign
companies on matters that have an effect on the national economy. One should
assume that the government was not keen on the liberalisation of agency services.
As Hughes commented, the contractual arrangements and exchanges needed for free
market operation cannot exist without the protection and enforcement of a
governmentally provided legal structure. (Hughes, 1994).
There are obvious problems in moving to contractual arrangements for the delivery
of goods and services if the rule of law, and the enforcement of contracts, is not well
established. Contracting works best where its outcomes are easy to specify. Where
the goals are vague and not clearly set down in writing, or where the corruption rate
is high, using contracts is unlikely to be successful.
It is true that the country needs a market based economy and a strong private sector,
these do not develop overnight, and do not do so without fundamentals related to
administrative systems, such as adherence to the rule of law, to maintain competition
and to prevent the emergence of monopolies. All these factors are lacking in most
cases (especially in developing countries). To assume that by simply turning the
activities over to the private sector will work without any other change is wishful
thinking. Markets require a competent and appropriate public sector.
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Summary of Chapter four:
We have seen that negative results of liberalisation outweigh the positive results. A
joint effort is needed to support the efficiency of the agency services through
performance improvement at the ports, customs offices, and road and railway
transport services. We have also seen that there is a need for government regulations
as guidance for the new environment so as to ensure fair competition and to avoid
unfair trade practises.

56

CHAPTER FIVE:
5.0

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

In this section, the author gives a summary of the study and identifies the underlined
consequences of the liberalisation of shipping agency services in Tanzania. The
suggested solutions to these negative consequences are given as recommendations to
both the government and the new shipping agency companies.
5.1

CONCLUSION:

It has been noted that government embarked upon privatisation as a way to overcome
the problems of State-owned enterprises, and to let the market forces play a role in
economical development. Two methods were used in the privatisation process, that
is, divestiture and non-divestiture methods. The divestiture method included public
sale covering joint venture; public management buy out, public share offering, public
auction and liquidation. Non-divestiture methods included restructuring and reforms
for those enterprises retained by the government. The restructuring aimed at
changing company operations to be more private than public by exposing the
enterprises to a free-market environment and removing monopoly power and
government subsidies. It was also aimed at improving efficiency through
competition. Development of local capital markets through the sale of shares of
privatised enterprises, and to gain social benefits
The study showed that, the government decided to restructure in three phases. The
first phase of the program was to form four independent companies to run agency
operations, the second phase was to issue shares of the established companies to
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employees, shipping lines and the general public, and the last phase was to liberalise
the agency sector by issuing agency licenses to private companies interested in the
business.

The whole program was due to take at least three years before full

liberalisation of agency services was concluded. The purpose was to give time to the
established companies to adapt to the new environment and get ready for
competition. During restructuring there was a lot to be changed in the company
structure and in the policies addressing employees’ behaviour and attitude. The
restructuring program therefore, was established in such a way as to enable a smooth
transformation of the company. It should also be noted that the government was
preparing the Act on Fair Trade Practices and a Code of Conduct for shipping agents
in its effort to create an enabling environment to accommodate the changes. The
company was in the first phase in which four subsidiary companies were established
(namely Azania Shipping Agency Company, Oceanic Shipping Agency Victoria
Shipping Agency Company and World-wide Shipping Agency Company) when a
significant unplanned disruption occurred.
The study revealed that agency licences were issued while the four companies were
still developing their operations to meet new environment: The government Act on
Fair Trade Practices and a Code of Conduct for shipping agents was not in operation
by the then, there were no special conditions imposed upon the applicants. About
thirty-five companies were licensed, including the major shipping lines.
It is the author’s opinion that to allow shipping lines to serve themselves as agents,
meant that independent agents were immediately put out of business because the
trade was dominated by liner trade. While liberalisation normally promotes
competition, in this case privatisation was hampered because there was unfair
competition between the shipping lines and independent agents. The shipping lines
were the principals of the agency companies but in the new structure the shipping
lines became both principals and agents.

The death of the four established

companies and other independent agents was inevitable.
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New agency companies on the other hand have expressed their satisfaction that they
could now offer better services to the customers and that efficiency had improved
tremendously. That was good news but efficiency in agency services alone could not
contribute, to any significant degree, to the economic development. Shipping agency
services needed to be supported by various related services such as port facilities,
customs procedures and inland infrastructure. A shipper from Uganda (a land locked
country) is more concerned with the port performance and the availability of the
railway wagons from Dar-es-Salaam to Kampala than with the efficiency of the
shipping agent. In order to get a positive impact from any improvement in efficiency
of agency services; other related services needed to be efficient too.
It is the author’s view that, in the present structure, where the transactions between
the principal and his agent have become an internal matter, a full disclosure of
income for tax purpose cannot be guaranteed. Expenses can be easily inflated and
income understated without being noticed and this will deny the government the
revenue as a tax deduction from these companies.

For this reason therefore,

government revenue is not assured, unlike with NASACO, which was previously
operating in the interests of the government.
Capital market development was one of the objectives of privatisation and the
government had launched a nation-wide campaign to educate people as to the
essence of share ownership. Unfortunately, the same government then denied the
employees and the general public the share ownership of the four established
companies by paralysing the operation to an extent that performance was no longer
attractive for share issuance. Liberalisation of shipping agency services therefore
could not contribute to the development of the capital market.
NASACO employees were to be made redundant in phases, subject to the availability
of funds to meet the cost. The Minister did not consider the impact of his abrupt
decision on employees, and as a result, the government had no money to meet the
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cost. The multiplier effect of the dismissed employees, was an increase in the
government expenditure by Tsh 3.5 billion as the cost of redundancy, increased
numbers of unemployed, a decrease in tax payers, a decrease in the purchasing power
of the affected group, and a relative decrease in the income of the producers of goods
and services consumed by the affected group. Thus privatisation as regards the
shipping agencies cannot in any way be seen to contribute to an improvement in the
living standards of Tanzanians.
5.2

RECOMMENDATIONS:

After a thorough analysis of the positive and negative consequences of the
liberalisation of shipping agency services, the author recommends the following
strategies for the government and the independent agency companies; in order to
realise the benefits of privatisation both at the national and company level.
5.2.1

For the government:

It is recommended that the government bring into force the Act on Fair Trade
Practices and the Code of Conduct for shipping agents, before the renewal of
licences issued to the new companies. The companies will then be subject to these
two legal instruments which will safeguard the interests of consumers and small
producers of goods and services and prevent the big operators from undermining the
small players. It is the responsibility of the government to formulate laws to enforce
contracts and safeguard property, because the contractual arrangements and
exchanges needed for effective market operation cannot exist without the protection
and enforcement of a governmentally provided legal structure.
The activation of these legal instruments will shape the market so as to provide for
fair competition through various provisions that prohibit anti-competitive behaviour.
It is also recommended that the government needs to develop criteria to evaluate the
results of privatisation in relation to the objectives.
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5.2.2

For Independent agents (indigenous):

It is recommended that the new independent agency companies, including the four
subsidiary companies of NASACO be required to form an alliance, that will enable
them to diversify their activities to include brokerage, cargo consolidation, packing
and warehousing, and inland transportation, because independent agents can no
longer survive on traditional liner agency services. As an alliance they can perform
better than in-house agencies through their experience and knowledge of local
environment. The future of independent agents is in multimodal operations.
Independent agents will need to focus more on cargo than on ships. They will need
to become cargo agencies to overcome the general trend for the shipping lines to
operate in-house agencies. They (the independent agents) will need to integrate their
activities into principals’ functions of marketing and sales.
In order to perform the above tasks successfully, the independent agents will need to
invest in Information Technology (IT). IT has become more important in modern
business, and as agents they need to be more closer to their principals and integrate
their activities to those of their principals and the Internet can facilitate this.
It is also recommended that independent shipping agents has to consider the
possibility of getting into joint ventures with shipping lines, that still need the
services of independent agents. They can also try to charter slots as an extended
service to their principals (cargo owners).
It is the view of the author that, if the above recommendations are acted upon it will
possible to rectify, at least partially, the serious damage done to the shipping agency
sector in Tanzania.
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